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PRESSURE OF THE POPULAR: PRESIDENTIAL
PRESTIGE AND THE HIGH COURT
Timothy W. Clark†
Popular Justice: Presidential Prestige and Executive Success in the
Supreme Court. By Jeff Yates. State University of New York Press, 2002.
131 pages. $17.95.
Some argue the 2000 presidential election was decided by the
1
judiciary branch (both the U.S. Supreme Court and Florida Supreme
2
Court ), not the voters. While the 2000 election reminded us of the
complex interaction that occurs among the judiciary, the presidency, and
the public, there is limited scholarship on this relationship. Despite being
written before the 2000 election (but regrettably not published until
2002), Popular Justice: Presidential Prestige and Executive Success in
3
the Supreme Court is one work that begins to systematically analyze this
interaction.
This relatively concise and intriguing book explores the interaction
between the United States Supreme Court and the presidency in the
modern era. Popular Justice takes up the current and longstanding
discussion where “judicial scholars assert that judicial decision making
can be explained largely by attitudinal, external, and political
4
determinants.” Specifically, this book speaks to the current debate
within the judicial politics literature on whether the Supreme Court is a

†
Timothy W. Clark is a Ph.D. student in Sociology at the University of
Minnesota and specializes in political sociology. His work focuses on the role of the law
and the state upon extra-legal processes. B.A. 1994, Sociology, Ohio University; M.A.
1996, Sociology, University of Georgia.
1. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000). See
also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2000).
3. JEFF YATES, POPULAR JUSTICE: PRESIDENTIAL PRESTIGE AND EXECUTIVE
SUCCESS IN THE SUPREME COURT (2002) [hereinafter POPULAR JUSTICE].
4. Id. at 2.
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majoritarian institution (subject to public opinion held by the majority or
the elites) or a counter-majoritarian institution (operating outside the
influence of the majority opinion of the public or elites). In the second
chapter, Yates succinctly reviews the status of theory and research on the
connections between the presidency and the U.S. Supreme Court. In this
debate where the non-majoritarian theories have long been a staple of
high school civics classes, and oft-cited by the founding fathers of the
5
United States, judicial observers have noted that in reality the court is
less than free from outside influences. For example, Justice Felix
Frankfurter noted that the court was constrained by the lack of ability to
6
enforce its decisions and its reliance on Congress for annual funding.
Additionally, other judicial scholars suggest “[j]ustices are no less
susceptible than other individuals in society to influence by evolving
7
societal norms and values.”
Readers should be cautioned that the core of this short book
(chapters 3-5) is laden with discussion of statistical analyses instead of
the typical descriptive qualitative evaluations usually found in
assessments of the relationship between presidential power and the
8
Supreme Court. Yates’ methodological focus, while often providing
very dry reading, is absolutely necessary. Yates begins to fill the void in
the research literature where there has been a “relative lack of systematic
quantitative analysis concerning how the Supreme Court has decided on
9
presidential power.”
As a social scientist trained in quantitative methodology, I find that
Popular Justice is an admirable, state-of-the-art analysis using sound
statistical techniques that effectively tease out factors affecting Supreme
Court decisions. Moreover, the book is an exemplary work using the
scientific social science method to investigate an important social and
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
7. See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions,
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 89 (1993). See also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME
COURT, 98 (Alfred A. Knopf 2001) (1987).
8. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY
OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (Oxford University Press 1992); JOAN
BISKUPIC & ELDER WITT, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT (Congressional Quarterly 1997); SHELDON GOLDMAN, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
AND THE PRESIDENTIAL AGENDA IN THE PRESIDENCY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Paul Brace et
al. eds. 1989); NORMAN C. THOMAS & JOSEPH A. PIKA, THE POLITICS OF THE PRESIDENCY
(CQ Press 1996); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (Random
House 1985).
9. POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 5.
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political issue. Yates uses the latest and most appropriate statistical
techniques to test a set of clearly defined hypotheses. In reviewing the
methodology, I had no argument with any of his findings and was very
impressed by his rigor and analysis.
In this book, Yates quantitatively examines three discrete types of
cases before the Supreme Court. Each analysis scrutinizes a different
type of case before the Court. The first analysis focuses on cases dealing
with the president’s formal statutory and constitutional powers. The
second analysis examines cases dealing with federal administrative
agencies, while the third analyzes cases deciding substantive policy
issues.
Yates’ analysis of cases involving the president’s formal statutory
and constitutional powers was inspired by Ducat and Dudley’s earlier
10
work on federal district courts. These researchers found presidential
approval ratings and judicial loyalty to the appointing president affected
presidential outcomes in the federal district courts. Yates essentially
duplicates Ducat and Dudley’s analysis but focuses on the president’s
public approval rating in Supreme Court decisions. Ultimately, Yates’
analysis reveals “interactions between the Court and the president
concerning the president’s formal powers are influenced by a variety of
factors, including presidential prestige and the justices’ ideological
11
inclinations.”
In chapter four, Yates shifts his analysis to cases involving federal
administrative agencies. Yates believes the courts serve as a place where
“[p]olitical consternation over partisan-based policy changes in the
12
federal agencies are often resolved . . . .” Likewise, presidential
scholars have noted that the federal bureaucracy has become one of the
13
president’s most-valuable tools for implementing policy preferences.
Thus, the federal agency has become an extension of presidential power.
Consequently this chapter’s analysis investigates “the deference paid to
president’s administrative agencies by the Supreme Court justices by
assessing the influence of attitudinal, political, and external factors

10. Craig R. Ducat & Robert L. Dudley, Federal District Judges and Presidential
Power during the Postwar Era, 51 J. POLS. 98, 98-118 (1989).
11. POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 46.
12. MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1968).
13. TERRY M. MOE, The Politicized Presidency, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY,
135, 135 (James P. Pfiffner ed. 1991); TERRY M. MOE, The Presidency and the
Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL
SYSTEM, 437 (Michael Nelson ed. 5th ed. 1998).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 16
16 CLARK - PAGINATED.DOC

788

12/8/2003 2:57 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2
14

including the impact of presidential prestige.”
Yates found
“presidential prestige affects justice decision making when the
15
president’s cabinet agencies come before the Court.”
Lastly, in chapter five, Yates completes his analysis by looking at
the effect of presidential prestige (and other attitudinal and political
factors) for cases before the Supreme Court that decide substantive
policy issues that the president actively supports. Yates’ analysis shows
16
presidential prestige had different effects depending on the issue.
Presidential prestige had little or no effect on issues of civil rights, labor
rights, diplomacy, or defense policy before the Court. However,
presidential prestige did have a significant effect on issues dealing with
law and order.
Chapter six details Yates’ conclusions based on the sum of the
findings of his three analyses. Yates concludes presidential power before
the court does depend on the president’s current popularity among the
population. Yates provides accurate and meaningful evidence that most
scholars, if confronted with this same evidence, would have to conclude
that presidential prestige, in most cases, had an effect on Supreme Court
decisions.
Reflecting on Yates’ findings leaves one with an uneasy feeling. As
a typical American, I have been taught the cardinal truth that Supreme
Court justices are insulated from external influences by nature of life
17
tenure and by appointment. The thought that these life-tenured rational
justices serving in the highest court of our land are swayed by popular
opinion and the latest opinion polls may leave me (and I assume other
typical Americans) a little unnerved. Thus, the evidence in Popular
Justice leaves the reader with the feeling that all is not as it seems, and
what we have been taught about the American “separation of powers”
may not hold true. It makes one wonder about veracity of the other
“truths” of the American political process that we have collectively
learned.

14.
15.
16.
17.

POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 102.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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